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We ask why pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) is generally deemed
morally unacceptable by lay people. Our approach to this question has two core
elements. First, we employ an interdisciplinary perspective, using philosophical
rationales as base for generating psychological models. Second, by testing these
models we investigate how different normative judgments on PCE are related
to each other. Based on an analysis of the relevant philosophical literature, we
derive two psychological models that can potentially explain the judgment that
PCE is unacceptable: the “Unfairness-Undeservingness Model” and the “Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model.” The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model holds that people
judge PCE to be unacceptable because they take it to produce unfairness and
to undermine the degree to which PCE-users deserve reward. The Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model assumes that people judge PCE to be unacceptable because
they find achievements realized while using PCE hollow and undeserved. We empirically
test both models against each other using a regression-based approach. When trying
to predict judgments regarding the unacceptability of PCE using judgments regarding
unfairness, hollowness, and undeservingness, we found that unfairness judgments were
the only significant predictor of the perceived unacceptability of PCE, explaining about
36% of variance. As neither hollowness nor undeservingness had explanatory power
above and beyond unfairness, the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model proved superior
to the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model. This finding also has implications for the
Unfairness-Undeservingness Model itself: either a more parsimonious single-factor
“Fairness Model” should replace the Unfairness-Undeservingness-Model or fairness
fully mediates the relationship between undeservingness and unacceptability. Both
explanations imply that participants deemed PCE unacceptable because they judged
it to be unfair. We conclude that concerns about unfairness play a crucial role in the
subjective unacceptability of PCE and discuss the implications of our approach for the
further investigation of the psychology of PCE.
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INTRODUCTION
Pharmacological Cognitive
Enhancement and Its Perceived
Unacceptability
There are a number of means to enhance cognitive capacities
beyond what is usually seen as compensation for an impairment.
Nutrition and physical exercise improve cognitive functioning in
healthy people across different domains (e.g., Dresler et al., 2013),
whilst commonplace stimulants such as caffeine temporarily
boost functions like alertness and concentration (e.g., Einöther
and Giesbrecht, 2013). Use of these techniques is uncontroversial.
Far more controversial is so-called “brain doping,” that is the use
of “pharmacological interventions that are intended to improve
certain mental functions and that go beyond currently accepted
medical indications” (Schermer et al., 2009, p. 77).
Such pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE)
may be achieved through the use of psychostimulants like
methylphenidate (e.g., Ritalin R©) and wakefulness-promoting
drugs like modafinil (e.g., Provigil R©). Research has demonstrated
that these substances can have performance-enhancing effects
in healthy individuals, for example by improving memory or
attention (for reviews, see Repantis et al., 2010; Battleday and
Brem, 2015; Ilieva et al., 2015). However, current PCE cannot
enhance performance to more than modest degrees at best,
depending on individual baseline performance (Husain and
Mehta, 2011; Caviola and Faber, 2015). Some societies have
witnessed a rise in the use of PCE (Care Quality Commission,
2013). Prevalence studies and informal polls suggest that at
least some members of different groups use pharmacological
substances with the goal to enhance their performance, for
instance researchers (Maher, 2008), surgeons (Franke et al.,
2013), and, across a range of countries, students (e.g., Singh et al.,
2014; Maier et al., 2015; Schelle et al., 2015).
Pharmacological cognitive enhancement not only receives
significant media attention, but is also intensively researched
in a range of academic disciplines. These disciplines share the
aim of understanding PCE (and mind-altering technologies in
general) better, and helping society to deal with the challenges
posed by increasing PCE use (cf. Greely et al., 2008; Smith and
Farah, 2011; Sahakian et al., 2015). PCE is a truly interdisciplinary
research topic, on which different disciplines can – and probably
ought to – collaborate (cf. Hildt and Franke, 2013; Maslen
et al., 2015). Neuroscience and the medical sciences investigate
the pharmacological effects and potential side-effects of such
substances (e.g., Turner et al., 2003). The behavioral and social
sciences deal with questions such as what drives individuals
to take PCE (e.g., Wolff and Brand, 2013), how members of
the general public perceive PCE (e.g., Sattler et al., 2013), and
which social consequences these perceptions might entail for
users (e.g., Faulmüller et al., 2013). Meanwhile researchers in
philosophy and law examine the ethical and legal problems PCE
use entails, weigh these against possible benefits, and in some
cases derive recommandations for public policy (e.g., Maslen
et al., 2014a) and legal regulation (e.g., Goold and Maslen, 2014).
In doing so, they rely on empirical research, as both findings on
the pharmacological effects of PCE (e.g., Maslen et al., 2014b),
as well as the public perception of PCE (e.g., Forlini et al.,
2013) are crucial inputs into ethical, legal and policy debates
regarding PCE.
Empirical studies on how members of the general public
perceive PCE have already uncovered a variety of concerns
people have about PCE, for example regarding medical safety
(e.g., Scheske and Schnall, 2012) and societal inequality (e.g.,
Fitz et al., 2013; for a review, see Schelle et al., 2014). The –
although often implicit – goal of many of these studies is to better
understand one consistent finding, namely that PCE is deemed
morally unacceptable (cf. Schelle et al., 2014). The judgment
that “PCE is morally unacceptable” – henceforth abbreviated as
“Unacceptability” – is also found in media reports and in much
of the normative debate. This article addresses the question: why
do lay people endorse Unacceptability? That is, why do they judge
PCE to be morally unacceptable?
The Present Research: Combining
Philosophical Rationales and
Psychological Explanations
The primary innovation of our contribution is to employ
an interdisciplinary perspective that combines normative
philosophical and empirical psychological analyses. We propose
that this combination provides a fruitful way to deepen
understanding of why people generally judge PCE to be morally
unacceptable. Philosophers who have explored moral responses
to PCE have frequently, amongst other things, been interested
in normative rationales, less in psychological explanations.
That is, they have often not been asking why, as a matter of
fact, people endorse a certain judgment, but why it might be
rational to endorse it. Thus, no psychological conclusions can be
straightforwardly drawn from philosophical work. However, we
suggest that philosophical rationales can be useful in generating
psychological hypotheses. As shown in the review by Schelle et al.
(2014), lay attitudes on PCE tend to coincide with the attitudes of
professional philosophers, suggesting that lay attitudes may have
partly the same bases as professional philosophical attitudes.
In other words, both philosophical rationalizations and lay
attitudes might in part be expressions of a common rational
thinking process, which philosophers make more explicit than
lay people. (It is important to note, however, that intuitive
lay judgments on PCE seem not always to be fully rational,
Scheske and Schnall, 2012; cf. Caviola et al., 2014). Philosophical
rationales for attitudes on PCE could thus be thought of as
making explicit the psychological mechanisms that motivate
acceptance of these attitudes in both philosophers and lay people,
in so far as both groups form these attitudes rationally. Hence,
we explore how philosophical rationales may aid psychology
in identifying credible explanations for lay endorsement of
Unacceptability.
We test the role of three judgments in explaining
Unacceptability: (1) “PCE produces unfair outcomes,” henceforth
“Unfairness,” (2) “achievements realized with the aid of PCE
are “hollow achievements” in the sense that they lack (some
of their usual) value,” henceforth “Hollowness,” and (3) “users
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of PCE do not deserve their achievements or the material
and non-material reward associated with them,” henceforth
“Undeservingness.” Based on philosophical literature we
generate two explanatory psychological models which are based
on Unfairness, Hollowness, and Undeservingness, and test these
against empirical data.
Philosophers have, implicitly or explicitly, endorsed
or at least considered not only Unacceptability, but also
Unfairness, Hollowness, and Undeservingness. More importantly,
recent applied philosophical work on the ethics of cognitive
enhancement has begun to explore the relationships between
these views, and related work in theoretical philosophy could
be deployed to further develop this understanding. Empirical
work, in contrast, has consistently shown that lay people are
concerned about unfairness induced by PCE use (cf. Schelle
et al., 2014), but has not tested whether achievements realized
with the help of PCE are seen as hollow or as undeserved
or investigated the relationships between these views. Hence,
it remains unclear precisely which, if any, of the judgments
Unfairness, Hollowness, and Undeservingness contribute to lay
endorsement of Unacceptability. For instance, is the perceived
unacceptability of PCE explained by the judgment that it
produces unfair outcomes, the judgment that users of cognitive
enhancements do not deserve the reward they received, by both,
or by neither? In addition, though it is possible that some or all of
these judgments jointly explain support for Unacceptability, it is
not clear (I) what relative contribution each judgment makes to
this explanation; and (II) how, if at all, they interact. In this paper,
we complement existing empirical research on the question of
why lay people endorse Unacceptability by comparing three
different factors (Unfairness, Hollowness, and Undeservingness)
with regard to their relative strength in explaining the overall
judgment of Unacceptability. We build on existing work by
examining two judgments (Hollowness and Undeservingness)
that have not previously been empirically investigated and by
examining how the three judgments we consider interact with
each other.
In sum, in this paper we combine philosophical rationales and
psychological explanations to investigate why PCE is judged as
morally unacceptable. We first outline two possible rationales
for Unacceptability, drawing on both applied and theoretical
philosophical work. We then offer two psychological models
grounded on these rationales—the Unfairness-Undeservingness
Model and the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model—and spell
out our research questions regarding these models. Next, we
describe our methods for testing these two models against
empirical psychological data using a regression-based approach,
before setting out the results of this testing. Finally, we discuss the
implications of our findings for the psychology and philosophy
of PCE.
PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALES
The lay judgment we ultimately wish to explain—
Unacceptability—holds that PCE is morally unacceptable.
This judgment has been endorsed by a number of philosophers,
who have considered a wide range of rationales for it. Broadly
speaking, these can be divided into three categories: rationales
that focus on the motives for which PCE is pursued (e.g., Little,
1998; Sandel, 2007), rationales that focus on the means by
which it is pursued (e.g., The President’s Council on Bioethics
(U.S.), 2003; Sandel, 2007), and rationales that focus on the
consequences of pursuing it (e.g., Fukuyama, 2002; Elliott, 2003).
In this section, our aim is not to offer a comprehensive review
of all these rationales—this would be too ambitious a task (for a
review, see Douglas, 2013). Rather, we limit ourselves to outlining
rationales that meet two conditions. First, they appeal to one
or more of the judgments Undeservingness, Hollowness, and
Unfairness outlined above. Second, they are consequence-based,
rather than motive- or means- based rationales. Our reason
for limiting our discussion to consequence-based rationales is
that adherents of a wide range of moral theories can accept
such rationales. Almost all moral theories allow that an act
or practice can be morally unacceptable because it has, or
can be expected to have, bad consequences. By contrast, it
is controversial whether an act can be morally unacceptable
purely because of the means that it involves or the motives that
produced it.1
Two prominently discussed rationales meet our two
conditions, namely what we call the “objection from fairness”
and the “objection from hollow achievements.” In what follows,
we set out our interpretations of these rationales.
The Objection from Fairness
A number of authors have endorsed, or at least considered,
the view that PCE (or enhancement more generally) may be
morally unacceptable because it is unfair or, perhaps equivalently,
constitutes a form of “cheating” (e.g., Fukuyama, 2002; The
President’s Council on Bioethics (U.S.), 2003; Rose, 2006;
Schermer, 2008). We call this the “objection from fairness.”
One variant of this objection holds that PCE is procedurally
unfair: that it involves unfair means. This is a means- rather
than consequence-based rationale for Unacceptability, and as
such we do not discuss it further. A second variant of
the objection holds that PCE is substantively unfair: that it
produces unfair outcomes, as Unfairness holds. This variant
of the objection is consequence-based, and will be our
focus.
1Consequentialist moral theories hold that the moral status of an act is determined
solely by its consequences (cf. Skorupski, 1995; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2001). On this
view, the only reason that an act can be morally unacceptable (or “impermissible”
or, simply, “wrong”) is that it has or can be expected to have bad consequences, or
worse consequences than the alternatives. Deontological and virtue-ethical moral
theories, such as those advanced by Immanuel Kant (e.g., 1786/2013) and Aristotle
(e.g., trans, 2014) and their respective followers, hold that further considerations
may be relevant. On most such theories, an act can be unacceptable even though it
produces good (or the best possible) consequences. For instance, on a deontological
theory, a good-maximizing act may be unacceptable because it violates someone’s
rights or breaks the terms of a contract. On a virtue-ethical theory, it may be
unacceptable because it is not what a virtuous agent would have done. However,
deontological and virtue-ethical theories typically allow that the value of the
consequences of an act remain relevant to the moral status of the act, and that an act
can in some cases be morally unacceptable because it produces bad consequences
which there is a duty not to produce, or which a fully virtuous agent would not
produce (cf. Bennett, 1989; Hursthouse, 1991).
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Two questions should be asked regarding this variant of the
objection from fairness. First, why think that Unfairness supports
Unacceptability? Second, why accept Unfairness in the first place?
The answer to the first question is straightforward, though not
normally made explicit in the literature on PCE: unfairness is bad,
and as noted above, proponents of a range of moral theories can
agree that, other things being equal, it is morally unacceptable
to produce bad consequences. Why, precisely, unfairness is bad
is controversial. Some hold that it is bad in itself (e.g., Broome,
1991). Others, would deny this and hold that fairness is only bad
if and because it tends to produce further bad consequences, such
as reduced individual wellbeing (e.g., Bentham, 1789; Sidgwick,
1893). However, despite this disagreement about why unfairness
is bad, many agree that it is bad, or at least typically so.
The second question—why should we accept Unfairness—
has caused greater controversy in the ethical debate regarding
PCE. On the one hand, it seems “obvious” (The President’s
Council on Bioethics (U.S.), 2003, p. 280) or at least “intuitive”
(Schermer, 2008, p. 88) that some instances of enhancement,
including PCE, produce unfairness. On the other hand, doubts
can be raised about whether all enhancements, or all PCEs, do
so (e.g., Savulescu, 2006; Douglas, 2007; Sandel, 2007; Schermer,
2008; Buchanan, 2011a,b; Santoni de Sio et al., in press). Hence,
the scope of application of Unfairness is contested. There is
also disagreement about how to rationalize Unfairness, that
is about why enhancement produces unfairness when it does.
One rationale holds that enhancement involves violating social
rules or conventions, and it is unfair if individuals acquire
reward through rule-violations (cf. Schermer, 2008). As has
been noted, however, those who raise fairness-based concerns
regarding enhancement frequently take these concerns to apply
regardless whether the enhancement in question violates a rule
(Schermer, 2008; Savulescu, 2009). For instance, in the context
of debate over enhancement in sport, concerns about production
of unfairness have often been presented as a justification for
maintaining prohibitions on enhancement rather than merely
a consequence of such prohibitions (e.g., Lenk, 2007; Corlett
et al., 2013). Similarly, philosophers concerned about fairness in
relation to PCE have not generally restricted their concerns to
rule-violating PCE (Fukuyama, 2002; The President’s Council on
Bioethics (U.S.), 2003). Hence, it seems appropriate to seek a
more general rationale for Unfairness—one that will apply even
in cases where PCE does not involve rule-violation. We suggest
that Undeservingness might be able to furnish such a rationale (cf.
also Schermer, 2008).
As defined above, Undeservingness is the judgment that PCE-
users do not deserve their achievements or the material (e.g.,
money) and non-material (e.g., praise) reward associated with
them. A number of authors in the debate on the ethics of
enhancement have explicitly considered this view (e.g., Mehlman,
2004; Schermer, 2008; Forsberg, 2013), and it has been suggested
(Douglas, 2014) that a similar view may be implicit in the work
of others (Harris, 2012; Sparrow, 2014). Moreover, opponents
of PCE frequently advance claims that can be understood
to support Undeservingness. For instance, although disputed
elsewhere (Douglas, 2014), it is often said that enhancement
makes achievements “too easy” or is a way of avoiding effort
(Cole-Turner, 2000; Kass, 2003). If true, this might support
Undeservingness, since exerting effort to overcome difficulties is
often thought to confer deservingness (Sadurski, 1985; Milne,
1986; Sorensen, 2010).
The relationship between Undeservingness and Unfairness has
not been explored in detail in the applied philosophical literature
on PCE (although cf. Mehlman, 2004; Schermer, 2008); however,
it is plausible that the two judgments are normatively connected.
One possibility is that Unfairness rationalizes Undeservingness—
that is, because users of PCE are the beneficiaries of unfairness,
they do not deserve their reward. Intuitively, people do not
deserve unfairly acquired benefits. For instance, when an athlete
breaks the rules of a sport and, as a result, wins a competition,
we would conclude that she has won unfairly, and this may
seem to support the view that she does not deserve the reward
that come with the victory. This sort of case might seem to
suggest that Unfairness is normatively more fundamental than
Undeservingness.
However, theoretical work on the nature of fairness suggests
that Undeservingness may be the more fundamental judgment:
Undeservingness may be able to support Unfairness.2 Some
prominent theoretical accounts of fairness can be interpreted
as holding that fairness, or at least one component of fairness,
requires that (material or non-material) reward are distributed
across individuals in proportion to the relative degree to which
those individuals deserve those reward (Broome, 1990; Feldman,
1995a; Kagan, 2012). In support of this conception of the
relationship between fairness and deservingness, consider the
following case: Two charity workers undertake humanitarian
projects in a poverty-stricken area without any expectation of
reward. Their projects are very different in difficulty and scope.
One spends several years single-handedly building a hospital
that will save thousands of lives over the coming decades. The
other spends one afternoon writing letters to local politicians,
with the effect that those politicians divert an additional $500
to the provision of affordable pain relief medications. This
can be expected to slightly increase the quality of life of each
of 100 migraine sufferers for around a week. Intuitively, the
first charity worker is more deserving than the second, all else
equal, but it would be difficult to rationalize this judgment
regarding deservingness by invoking the concept of fairness.
On the other hand, the judgment regarding deservingness does
seem potentially capable of rationalizing a judgment regarding
fairness. Suppose both charity works receive similar levels of
praise for their efforts. Intuitively, this is unfair. The first charity
working deserves more praise, and it seems unfair if he does not
get it.
A similar line of reasoning suggests that Unfairness may be
able to rationalize Undeservingness. Imagine a case in which
two scientists, A and B, make similar and highly significant
scientific discoveries. Suppose, however, that A made her
discovery assisted by PCE which allowed her to work longer
hours and more productively, whereas B made the discovery
2A third possibility is that Unfairness and Undeservingness are logically connected
though neither is more fundamental than the other. For instance, it may be that to
say that X enjoys an unfair advantage over Y is just to say that A does not deserve
her advantage.
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without any such pharmacological assistance. Although we do
not ourselves endorse this view, according to Undeservingness,
A does not deserve her achievement or the praise, academic
success, and other reward that accompany it, perhaps because her
enhancement allows her to avoid effort, or made her achievement
“too easy.” On the other hand, it is plausible to assume that B
does deserve her achievement and associated reward, at least to
some extent. However, despite this difference in deservingness,
it is likely that these two scientists will receive a similar size of
reward for these achievements, at least if A’s PCE-use is secret
(cf. Faulmüller et al., 2013). Thus, rewards are not distributed in
proportion to deservingness, and this, on the present conception
of fairness, is unfair. Hence, if (1) Undeservingness holds true,
and 2) PCE users are rewarded to a similar degree as non-users
who achieve similar things, then use of PCE may disrupt fairness.
The Objection from Hollow
Achievements
A second candidate rationale for Unacceptability invokes
Hollowness—the claim that achievements realized with the aid
of PCE are “hollow achievements” in the sense that they lack
(some of their normal) value. This claim, or variants thereof,
have been endorsed by a number of authors in the ethical
debate on PCE, and enhancement more generally. Juengst
(2000) raised the question whether achievements realized via
enhancement might be “hollow accomplishments” (p. 39), and
The President’s Council on Bioethics (U.S.) (2003) claimed that
enhancements would undermine the “dignity” (p. 140) of human
performance and perhaps render that performance “false” (p.
131), thereby highlighting two specific values (dignity and truth)
that enhancements might threaten. In what follows, we focus on
the question whether PCE might deprive human achievements of
some degree of value without taking a stance on what particular
kind of value that might be. Following Juengst’s terminology, we
call this the “objection from hollowness.”
As with the objection from fairness, two questions should be
asked regarding the objection from hollowness. First, why think
that Hollowness supports Unacceptability? Second, why accept
Hollowness?
On the first question, why Hollowness supports
Unacceptability, little has been said. However, it is possible
to construct a straightforward argument from Hollowness to
Unacceptability. According to Hollowness, achievements realized
with the aid of PCE lack (some of their normal) value, and
this means that pursuit of enhancement has at least one bad
consequence: it diminishes at least some forms of value that our
achievements might otherwise have had.
More has been said on the second question: why accept
Hollowness? That is, why judge achievements gained with the
help of PCE to be hollow achievements? On one view, PCE use
can devalue achievements because it corrupts the very purpose
of the activity being pursued (e.g., Santoni de Sio et al., in
press). In this regard, using an enhancement might – to take
an often-cited example – be like completing a marathon with
the aid of roller skates (Whitehouse et al., 1997). Some activities
(including marathon running) fulfill their purpose only where
pursued in a certain kind of way, and in some cases enhancement
is incompatible with the required manner of execution. This
may be because the activities in question only have value when
they manifest a certain kind of human contribution, and the
use of enhancement somehow negates the need for any such
contribution (Savulescu, 2015). However, as many have noted,
not all activities are such that their purpose is undermined when
they are pursued with the aid of enhancements (e.g,. Douglas,
2007; Bostrom and Roache, 2008; Roache, 2008; Schermer, 2008;
Goodman, 2010; Santoni de Sio et al., in press). Consider landing
an airplane or performing a surgical operation. The purpose of
these activities is to realize a certain outcome, and the realization
of that outcome need not be threatened, and may even be
aided, by the use of enhancements (cf. Santoni de Sio et al.,
2014). Moreover, activities that would be rendered hollow by
very extensive enhancements may not be rendered hollow by
more modest ones. For instance, climbing Mount Everest with
the aid of a jetpack might render it a hollow achievement, but
it is far less clear that climbing with the aid of compressed
oxygen, or regular morning coffees, does so. Hence, we think that
the present argument cannot support the claim that, generally,
achievements realized via PCE are hollow, as some have suggested
(e.g., The President’s Council on Bioethics (U.S.), 2003). As with
Unfairness, then, it is desirable to seek a more general rationale
for Hollowness. And as with Unfairness, we suggest that it may be
possible to provide such a rationale by using Undeservingness.
It is often thought that things that are normally valuable can
lack this value when they are not deserved. For instance, pleasure
is normally valuable—it normally makes the world a better place
when a person experiences pleasure—but some argue that it
lacks its normal value when it is not deserved (e.g., Brentano,
1969; Feldman, 1995b). Hence, on this view, pleasure is, other
things being equal, less valuable when it is enjoyed by a mass-
murderer than when it is enjoyed by an innocent person. Similar
thoughts may apply to valuable achievements. It may be that,
when achievements are underserved, they lack value. If so, and if
PCE undermines deservingness, then achievements realized with




Based on philosophical literature on PCE and on relevant work
in moral theory, we have outlined two possible philosophical
rationales for Unacceptability, that is the claim that PCE is
morally unacceptable. According to the first rationale, the
objection from fairness, Unacceptability can be rationalized by
appeal to Unfairness and Undeservingness. According to the
second rationale, the objection from hollowness, Unacceptability
can be rationalized by appeal to Hollowness and Undeservingness.
We do not claim that these rationales constitute the only
plausible ways of understanding the normative relationships
3Again, however, other conceptions of the relationship between Deservingness and
Hollowness are also plausible. For instance, it may be that when a person realizes
an achievement without making the appropriate kind of human contribution, this
independently renders both the achievement hollow and the achiever undeserving
of reward.
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between these judgments. For one thing, we have limited
ourselves to rationales that can be understood as appealing
to bad consequences of enhancement, yet we do not rule
out the possibility that there are plausible motive- or means-
based rationales for Unacceptability. For another, there may be
consequence-based rationales for Unacceptability that we have
not considered. We also do not claim that these rationales
are in the end successful; indeed, one of us has previously
argued against a view similar to Undeservingness (Douglas,
2014). However, we do claim the two rationales we have
outlined are among the prima facie plausible rationales for
Unacceptability.
Based on the idea that philosophical justifications can form the
basis for psychological models, we derive two such models from
our theoretical analyses above.
(1) The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model: People judge
PCE to be unacceptable because they take it to produce
unfairness and undermine the degree to which PCE-users
deserve their achievement and associated reward. In other
words, lay judgments of Unacceptability can be jointly
explained by Unfairness and Undeservingness.
(2) The Hollowness-Undeservingness Model: People judge
PCE to be unacceptable because they find achievements
while using PCE hollow and undeserved. In other words,
lay judgments of Unacceptability can be jointly explained by
Hollowness and Undeservingness.
Note that in our philosophical analysis we discuss different
possibilities for causal relationships between Unfairness and
Undeservingness and between Hollowness and Undeservingness,
respectively. For the sake of starting out with parsimonious
models for empirical testing, we do not specify causal
relationships beyond causes for Unacceptability in the
psychological part. However, we return to the issue of a
causal order of the explanatory variables in the discussion of our
empirical results.
Research Questions
The purpose of this paper is to combine normative philosophical
and empirical psychological analyses to gain a deeper
understanding of why people generally judge PCE to be
morally unacceptable. We have derived two philosophically
informed models for possible psychological explanations. Based
on our theoretical analyses, we formulate the following two
research questions.
(I) How well can the judgments Undeservingness, Unfairness,
and Hollowness explain Unacceptability?
(II) How do these judgments interact, that is, more specifically:
which of the two models, the Unfairness-Undeservingness
Model or the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model, is better
supported by empirical data?
In what follows, we report a test of these philosophy-grounded
research questions against empirical data.
PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS
Methods
We tested our research questions by re-analyzing parts of a
larger data set we had collected and reported on previously
(for details, see Faber et al., 2015a). For 94 participants, this
data set contains information on the PCE-related judgments
of interest, that is answers on Undeservingness, Unfairness,
Hollowness, and Unacceptability. (The other participants in the
complete data set did not answer questions in relation to
cognitive enhancement but on motivation enhancement, so their
judgments are not relevant for the present study. Please see
Faber et al. (2015a) for further details on this data set.) Hence,
our present sample contained 94 U.S. American participants
(48% female, mean age 36.9 years4), who indicated that they
had not previously used PCE. All respondents completed
the study online. They gave informed consent to participate
and were compensated financially for their participation. This
study had been reviewed and approved by the University
of Oxford’s Medical Sciences Interdivisional Research Ethics
Committee.
After answering demographic questions, each participant
read a hypothetical scenario about a male student who uses
PCE. The part of the scenario describing this use read as
follows: “While preparing for his exams, Alex takes medical
substances to help him with his work. These pills normally
are available on prescription only to treat certain diseases,
but Alex knows that they improve brain performance in
healthy people. They can make people think faster and
more clearly. By taking these “smart pills,” he hopes to
do better in his exams.” After participants had read the
scenario, they answered several questions on 7-point Likert-
scales (1 = “completely disagree”; 7 = “completely agree”).
There was one item each for Undeservingness (“If Alex does
well in his exams, he deserves praise,” reversely coded) and for
Hollowness (“If Alex does well in his exams, it will be a hollow
achievement”). To capture the frequent use of the more familiar
concept of “cheating” to express concerns about unfairness,
we included two items for Unfairness, one referring explicitly
to the concept of unfairness (“It will be unfair if Alex does
better in his exams than his classmates who don’t take the
“smart pills”) and one to “cheating” (“Taking “smart pills” is
cheating”). We used the mean of both items, which were highly
correlated [r(92) = 0.842, p < 0.001], in subsequent analyses.
(The pattern of results reported below remains unchanged
when only the explicit unfairness item or the “cheating”
item is included.) Finally, we assessed participants’ global
judgment about Unacceptability (“Taking medical substances
that improve smartness is acceptable”; reversely coded). (For
further questions asked that are not relevant for this re-
analysis and, hence, not reported below, see Faber et al.,
2015a.)
4Our participants were of mixed gender, age, as well as educational and
socioeconomic backgrounds. They all lived in the USA, however, and in this sense
our sample is quite restricted. We cannot be sure that our results can be generalized
to people from other cultural backgrounds.
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Results
To answer our research questions (I) how well the factors
Undeservingness, Unfairness, and Hollowness can explain
Unacceptability, and (II) which of the two proposed models,
the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model and the Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model, is better supported by our data, we used
a regression-based approach.5
Descriptive Statistics
To begin with, to get a sense of the general view of Unacceptability
in our sample, we performed a descriptive analysis. This
analysis showed that the mean level of agreement that PCE is
unacceptable was 4.70 (SD = 1.72); the median agreement was
scale point 5 (“somewhat agree”). 58.6% of participants agreed
(between strongly and somewhat) to Unacceptability, while 30.9%
disagreed (between strongly and somewhat). The remaining
10.6% were undecided. Hence, in line with previous findings
on non-users, participants in our sample on average exhibited
support for Unacceptability, although there was a considerable
variance in this view.
Similarly, we looked at the descriptive statistics for Unfairness,
Hollowness, and Undeservingness. The mean level of agreement
for Unfairness was 4.70 (SD = 1.76), and the median 5. The
percentage of participants agreeing to Unfairness was 59.6%, and
27.7% disagreed. For Hollowness, the mean was 4.15 (SD= 1.79),
and the median was 4. 45.7% of participants agreed to Hollowness,
and 41.5% disagreed. For Undeservingness, the mean was 3.76
(SD = 1.61), the median 3. 33.1% agreed with Undeservingness,
51.1% disagreed. Hence, while the participants in our sample
judged PCE as unfair on average, they were divided on the view
whether its use makes achievements hollow, and overall did not
agree with the claim that achievements gained with PCE are
generally undeserved.
The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model
We tested the degree to which variations in agreement to
Unfairness and Undeservingness could explain variations in
agreement to Unacceptability, thereby evaluating the ability of
the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model to explain the perceived
unacceptability of PCE.
We conducted a linear regression analysis with
Unacceptability as dependent variable and Unfairness and
Undeservingness as predictors. Our two predictors explained a
significant amount of the variance in the dependent variable
[F(2,91) = 27.80, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.379, R2adjusted = 0.366].
However, in this regression only Unfairness was a significant
predictor of Unacceptability [β = 0.48, t(91) = 3.72, p < 0.001],
while Undeservingness had no significant explanatory power
beyond Unacceptability [β = 0.16, t(91) = 1.27, p = 0.208].
(Unfairness and Undeservingness were significantly correlated
[r(92)= 0.769, p< 0.001], but multi-collinearity statistics showed
no reason for concern in our data for this regression analysis
5Using regression analyses seemed most appropriate to us given our specific
research questions, but also in light of the ongoing debate on the statistical
(in)appropriateness of dichotomizing continuous variables via median splits to use
ANOVAs (e.g., Rucker et al., 2015).
(Unfairness: Tolerance = 0.409, VIF = 2.446; Undeservingness:
Tolerance= 0.409, VIF= 2.446).
In sum, while the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model can
account for about 38% of the variance in Unacceptability
judgments, its explanatory power is mainly driven by Unfairness.
The Hollowness-Undeservingness Model
Analogously to the calculations for the Unfairness-
Undeservingness Model, we tested the plausibility of
the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model in explaining
Unacceptability.
A linear regression analysis with Unacceptability as dependent
variable and Hollowness and Undeservingness as predictors
showed that the two predictors significantly explained the
dependent variable [F(2,91) = 22.72, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.333,
R2adjusted = 0.318]. In this regression, Hollowness was a
significant predictor of Unacceptability [β = 0.35, t(91) = 2.57,
p = 0.012], and Undeservingness had marginally significant
explanatory power [β = 0.26, t(91) = 1.89, p = 0.062].
(Hollowness and Undeservingness were significantly correlated
[r(92)= 0.781, p< 0.001], but multi-collinearity statistics showed
no reason for concern regarding the reliability of our data
(Hollowness: Tolerance = 0.390, VIF = 2.564; Undeservingness:
Tolerance= 0.390, VIF= 2.564).
In sum, when regarded on its own (i.e., not in comparison
to the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model), the Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model explains about 33% of Unacceptability,
with the influence of Undeservingness being only marginally
significant.
Comparing the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model
and the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model
In a further step, we compared the Hollowness-Undeservingness
Model to the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model, looking at
whether the former has any power in explaining Unacceptability
beyond the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model.
We used all three factors Unfairness, Hollowness, and
Undeservingness, as predictors in a linear regression with
Unacceptability as dependent variable. We found that Hollowness
as an additional predictor only added 1.2% to the explanatory
power of the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model, which is a
non-significant change [F(1,90) = 1.73, p = 0.193, R2 = 0.391,
R2adjusted = 0.371]. Correspondingly, with all three predictors
in the regression analysis, only Unfairness had a significant
influence on Unacceptability [β = 0.41, t(90) = 2.93, p = 0.004],
while both Undeservingness [β = 0.07, t(90) = 0.50, p = 0.662]
and Hollowness [β = 0.19, t(91) = 1.31, p = 0.193] had
none. Again, Hollowness was significantly correlated with both
Undeservingness [r(92) = 0.781, p < 0.001] and Unfairness
[r(92) = 0.757, p < 0.001], but collinearity statistics seemed
unproblematic (Unfairness: Tolerance = 0.346, VIF = 2.888;
Hollowness: Tolerance = 0.330, VIF = 3.027; Undeservingness:
Tolerance= 0.316, VIF= 3.164).
This model comparison reveals the importance of Unfairness
in explaining Unacceptability. Both Hollowness [β = 0.55,
t(92) = 6.38, p = 0.001] and Undeservingness [β = 0.53,
t(92) = 6.05, p < 0.001] are significantly associated with
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Unacceptability when considered on their own, that is, as
sole predictors. As soon as Unfairness is taken into account,
however, they do not show any additional power in explaining
Unacceptability. Put differently, while all three factors Unfairness,
Hollowness, and Undeservingness jointly can explain about
39% of Unacceptability, Unfairness alone already explains
about 36% [F(1,92) = 53.64, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.361,
R2adjusted = 0.361]. This 2.3% improvement in explanation
Hollowness and Undeservingness can bring is statistically
insignificant (p= 0.193, as reported above).
In sum, this analysis showed that the Unfairness-
Undeservingness Model is superior to the Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model in explaining Unacceptability, and
that this superiority is driven by Unfairness. Amongst the
three predictors Unfairness, Hollowness, and Undeservingness,
Unfairness is the only one making a contribution in explaining
Unacceptability beyond the two others.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we aimed to gain a deeper understanding of
why people generally endorse Unacceptability, that is judge
PCE as morally unacceptable. For that, we combined normative
philosophical and empirical psychological analyses.
The Central Role of Unfairness in
Explaining the Unacceptability of PCE
Based on philosophical literature, we argued that three
judgments could be deployed to normatively rationalize
Unacceptability, namely Unfairness (the idea that PCE produces
unfair outcomes), Hollowness (the idea that achievements
gained with PCE are hollow achievements), and Undeservingness
(the idea that users of PCE are less deserving of reward).
We developed philosophical rationales that combined these
three judgments in different ways and, based on these
rationales, proposed two psychological models that could
potentially explain why lay people4 endorse Unacceptability.
The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model holds that judgments
of Unacceptability can be jointly explained by Unfairness
and Undeservingness, and the Hollowness-Undeservingness
Model holds that judgments of Unacceptability can be jointly
explained by Hollowness and Undeservingness. We formulated
two research questions: (I) How well can Undeservingness,
Unfairness, and Hollowness can explain Unacceptability?
And (II) is the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model or the
Hollowness-Undeservingness Model better supported by
empirical data?
We then tested these two research questions in a sample
of lay people who indicated that they had not previously used
PCE, using a regression-based approach. Descriptively, while
participants tended to agree with the overall statements that PCE
is unacceptable (Unacceptability) and with the claim that it is
unfair (Unfairness), they were divided on the question whether
it leads to achievements being hollow (Hollowness), and, on
average, they tended to disagree with the idea that achievements
gained with PCE are undeserved (Undeservingness).
With regards to our first research question, we found that
Unfairness was clearly the strongest predictor of Unacceptability,
explaining about 36% of the variance in Unacceptability
judgments. While the two remaining judgments, Hollowness
and Undeservingness, were also able to significantly predict
Unacceptability when considered as sole predictors, they had
no significant influence over and above Unfairness. All three
predictors combined explained about 39% of variance. In other
words, although people who judge PCE to be unacceptable
also judge accomplishments gained with help of PCE to be
undeserved and these achievements to be hollow, the two latter
factors seem not to be necessary to explain why people endorse
Unacceptability. All they can contribute to the explanation is just
as well explained by Unfairness alone. Concerns about unfairness,
on the other hand, seem to be central in understanding why PCE
is judged as unacceptable.
With regards to our second research question, we
consequently found that the Unfairness-Undeservingness
Model was superior to the Hollowness-Undeservingness Model
in explaining Unacceptability. While, again, the Hollowness-
Undeservingness Model appeared to well explain Unacceptability
when regarded on its own, a direct comparison to the
Unfairness-Undeservingness Model showed that it did not
make any contribution to understanding why PCE is judged
as unacceptable beyond what we gain from the Unfairness-
Undeservingness Model. Hence, if we are to accept one of these
models, we should accept the Unfairness-Undeservingness
Model.
Importantly, however, in the Undeservingness-Unfairness
Model, Unfairness was the only predictor to make a
significant contribution in explaining Unacceptability, while
Undeservingness was not. What implications does this fact have
for the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model?
An “Unfairness Model” or Unfairness as
Mediating Variable?
When we proposed the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model, we
hypothesized that “people find PCE unacceptable because they
take it to produce unfairness and undermine the degree to
which the PCE-user deserves her achievement and associated
reward. In other words, lay judgments of Unacceptability can be
jointly explained by Unfairness and Undeservingness.” We found,
however, that when we have knowledge about Unfairness, we do
not need Undeservingness to explain Unacceptability. There seem
to be two plausible possibilities of how this can be interpreted.
It could be taken to support either a single-factor “Unfairness
Model,” or the view that Unfairness acts as the mediating variable
within the Unfairness-Undeservingness Model.
The straight-forward conclusion from our findings would
be to propose a model we could call the “Unfairness
Model.” An ideal model is one that offers a good trade-off
between parsimoniousness and explanatory power. As Unfairness
alone explains Unacceptability just as well as the Unfairness-
Undeservingness Model, it seems appropriate to just reject
Undeservingness and to propose a model that is based solely
on Unfairness. This Unfairness Model could, of course, not
fully explain why people judge PCE as morally unacceptable,
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but it could explain around 36% of variance in Unacceptability
judgments, which is a considerable amount. Proposing such an
Unfairness Model would imply that Undeservingness (and also
Hollowness) are purely epiphenomenal. That is, people find PCE
morally unacceptable because they find it unfair. And, when they
find it unfair, then they judge achievements realized with it to also
be undeserved (and hollow). This would be consistent with the
view that Unfairness may rationalize Undeservingness, rather than
the reverse (cf. section The Objection from Fairness).
There is, however, a second possibility that is consistent with
our data. The Unfairness-Undeservingness Model could still be
a plausible model, with the relationship between Undeservingness
and Unacceptability being mediated by Unfairness. As described
above, our original version of the Unfairness-Undeservingness
Model proposed that “judgments of Unacceptability can be
jointly explained by Unfairness and Undeservingness.” While
it seems that “jointly” is not correct (as Undeservingness
doesn’t add anything to this joint explanation), it might be that
Undeservingness influences Unacceptability via Unfairness. This
would imply that people find PCE unacceptable because they find
it unfair, and they find it unfair because they find achievements
realized with it undeserved. Such a causal chain would be in
line both with our data and with philosophical considerations.
While we find Undeservingness to be a significant predictor of
Unacceptability, this relationship breaks down as soon as we
add Unfairness as a second predictor. If, statistically, Unfairness
were a full mediator of the relationship between Undeservingness
and Unacceptability, we would expect such a result. Moreover,
while no causal order between the variables Unfairness and
Undeservingness has been assumed in our psychological model,
it has been implicit in our philosophical rationales: in the
section on “the objection from fairness,” we suggested that
Undeservingness may rationalize Unfairness which in turn may
rationalize Unacceptability. Hence, our philosophical analysis
suggests a causal chain leading from Undeservingness over
Unfairness to Unacceptability.
Unfortunately, based on our analyses we cannot assess which
of the above possibilities (a single-factor Unfairness Model
or Unfairness as the mediating variable in the Unfairness-
Undeservingness Model) is true. Path analyses could give a good
indication in larger samples, and controlled experiments could
provide strong conclusions. We hope that future research will
shed further light on the relationship between Undeservingness
and Unfairness.
Importantly, however, both possibilities have at their core
the same conclusion, namely that Unfairness plays a central
role in explaining Unacceptability, and that we would need to
understand why people find PCE unfair if we want to understand
why they find it morally unacceptable. Or, put differently, it
might well be that a lot of support for the view that PCE is
unacceptable would dissolve if PCE was seen as fair. And indeed,
concerns about the unfairness of PCE loom large in both the
normative debate (e.g., Fukuyama, 2002; The President’s Council
on Bioethics (U.S.), 2003; Gazzaniga, 2006; Rose, 2006) and lay
people’s concerns (e.g., Forlini and Racine, 2012; Scheske and
Schnall, 2012; Bossaer et al., 2013; Dubljevic et al., 2014; Santoni
de Sio et al., in press for a review, see Schelle et al., 2014, p. 8–11).
However, again, to date we cannot be certain what the causal
relationship between Unfairness and Unacceptability is. So while
PCE could be seen as unacceptable because it is seen as unfair, it
might also be the other way around (PCE may be seen as unfair
because seen as unacceptable), or bi-directional.
Understanding the Psychology of PCE
The approach followed in this paper had two core elements. First,
we took an interdisciplinary stance by combining normative
philosophical and empirical psychological analyses. Second, we
tried to shed light on how different normative judgments on
PCE are related to each other psychologically. We hope that
our approach has not only helped to advance research on the
specific question why PCE is generally found unacceptable, but
also to illustrate how philosophical analyses can be helpful in
understanding the psychology of PCE.
With regards to interdisciplinarity, we hope to have shown
how hypotheses derived from philosophical reasoning can serve
as guideline about which psychological relationships are fruitful
for testing. It would also be interesting, we think, to explore the
reverse strategy, that is to use psychological findings to generate
philosophical “hypotheses” than can be tested by normative
or conceptual analyses. It might, for example, be worthwhile
for philosophers to consider whether Undeservingness and
Hollowness could be normatively epiphenomenal, in the sense
that they are implications of Unfairness but play no role in the
rationalization of Unacceptability by Unfairness.
With regards to our aim to test relations between different
judgments on PCE, we think that this is not only worthwhile,
but necessary both from an academic and a practical perspective.
When we want to understand the psychology of cognitive
enhancement, that is how human beings react to PCE and other
mind-altering technologies, we need to gain more than a list
of reactions these technologies evoke. Rather, we need to know
which reactions are cause, and which are consequence; which are
central and which are epiphenomenal.
Understanding the psychology of PCE, in turn, is necessary
to estimate the non-pharmacological consequences of PCE use.
Psychological reactions based on subjective judgments about PCE
can be powerful. For instance, people tend to subjectively judge
PCE as more effective than it actually is (Ilieva et al., 2013)
and some employ it to cope with elevated stress (e.g., Wiegel
et al., 2015). However, consuming PCE seems to be detrimental
to reducing stress, but on the contrary weakens the protective
effect of internal personal resources against burnout (Wolff et al.,
2014). Moreover, it has been argued that the prevalent negative
judgments of others regarding PCE can cause considerable
psychological costs for users (for example reduced self-esteem;
Faulmüller et al., 2013).
Increased understanding of psychological processes is also
crucial for assessing the consequences PCE has beyond individual
users. Current pharmacological research on the effectiveness
of PCE substances measures how they influence participants’
individual performance. Based on such research, it has been
argued that the use of PCE would also be beneficial on a societal
level, for example, because enhancements will increase human
productivity, resulting in general economic benefits through
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either greater availability of goods or lower prices (Bostrom and
Ord, 2006; Buchanan, 2008, 2011a,b). However, a psychological
understanding of normative attitudes to enhancement could
complicate this picture. Employing a psychological perspective,
it has been illustrated that the effect of PCE on an individual’s
performance can be increased, but also be reduced, completely
eliminated or even reversed at a group level (Faber et al., 2015b):
The effectiveness of PCE in improving group performance
depends on the psychological processes within the group, which,
in turn, is guided by the subjective judgments the group members
make about PCE. If, for example, group members who do not
use PCE form negative attitudes to PCE-users, this can lead to
these two parties not interacting efficiently and not functioning
well as a performance group. In such a case, even though a
PCE substance is an enhancement of individual performance (for
pharmacological reasons), it could even act as an impairment
for a group (for psychological reasons). Therefore, subjective
judgments about PCE can determine the performance benefits
groups can – or cannot – draw from PCE.
Hence, if we want to know how PCE affects us as a society,
we need to understand not only the pharmacology, but also the
psychology associated with such technologies. We think that both
employing an interdisciplinary perspective and investigating the
relationships between judgments on PCE is fruitful to understand
this psychology. At present, research on the public perception
of PCE and its consequences is still in its infancy. We hope
that in the near future we will have a more comprehensive
and coherent picture of the psychology of PCE – both for our
academic understanding of human enhancement and to assist
policy making.
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